Category Archives: Constitution

A Concise Diagnosis

In an aside in a recent column about the January 6th hearings, Jennifer Rubin really summed up the current crisis (or more accurately, crises) in American governance.

Trump utterly failed the country; his successor is stymied by a radicalized opposition determined to see him fail. The Senate is gridlocked by a minority party wielding the filibuster to, among other things, preserve voter suppression and subversion laws. The Supreme Court has been overtaken by rank, radical partisans whose decisions cannot be defended on the merits and whose public utterances and tone lack any semblance of “judicial temperament.” We seem stuck because structural advantages for the minority (the Senate, the electoral college, the right-wing Supreme Court) make real reform impossible.

Rubin’s main thrust was the meaning of the very real heroism displayed by poll workers Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss. (The column was written before the even more impressive bravery displayed by Cassidy Hutchinson this week.)

Unlike a number of the witnesses called by the committee, these two women–mother and daughter–weren’t high-ranking members of the administration or Department of Justice, people who might lose a current job but would have little trouble finding new ones. Freeman and Share are ordinary citizens who were doing some of the low-paid jobs essential to the operation of democratic elections. Rubin is certainly correct in lauding the courage they displayed both in doing those jobs accurately and in testifying; her point was that they served the country just as surely as our military does, and that we need civilians “like Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss in public life if we are to muddle through a dangerous and disturbing period in our history.”

I don’t disagree, but I remain fixated on the quoted paragraph, because it succinctly sums up the challenges we currently face–and their magnitude.

I’ve written several times about the filibuster, and how its current use differs substantially from its historic one. The wrongheaded protection of what the filibuster has become allows a minority of lawmakers– who have been elected by a minority of voters– to veto the demonstrable will of the great majority of American citizens.

I need not reiterate the evidence showing how drastically the current Supreme Court has deviated from what was thought to be settled jurisprudence. To use a term beloved by a former vice-presidential candidate, the Court’s majority has “gone rogue.” To the extent that Americans were relying on the judiciary to protect fundamental rights, the Court’s current majority has signaled repeatedly that such reliance is misplaced–at least, so long as that majority fancies itself a religious tribunal rather than a court of law  bound by precedent and serving a theologically and ideologically diverse population.

In the final sentence of that quoted paragraph, Rubin alludes to what has become my most pressing–and depressing– concern: the obsolescence of much of America’s electoral and governing systems.

I doubt we can ever do anything about the fact that electing two senators from every state, irrespective of massive disproportions in population, means that very soon 70% of the Senate will represent 30% of the population. So long as our rogue court continues to protect partisan gerrymandering, lawmakers in both houses will continue to be answerable primarily–indeed, overwhelmingly– to rural Americans. The difficulty of amending the Constitution means we are probably saddled with the Electoral College for the foreseeable future–I don’t hold out much hope that the National Popular Vote Compact will be ratified by states having the necessary 270 electoral votes. (I would love to be wrong!)

The only remedy I can see would be a massive turnout in November repudiating the GOP –turnout large enough to allow Democrats  to get rid of the filibuster and pass a number of remedial measures–most importantly, the voting rights act. That law  would–among other salutary consequences– outlaw gerrymandering. Congress could also add Justices to the Court, diluting the power of the Court’s radical theocrats.

Are the Democrats perfect? Certainly not. But they’e a thousand times saner than the cult that is today’s GOP. If that cult loses badly enough, it will either be reformed from within, by genuine conservatives like Adam Kitzinger and Liz Cheney, or go the way of the Whigs.

Either way, We the People could then go back to arguing over our policy differences, rather than the survival of the republic.

In a very real way, Rubin was right: America’s future depends on ordinary citizens–those who do their jobs, and especially those who cast their votes to rescue the Constitution and Bill of Rights from the autocrats and theocrats. I’m clinging by my fingernails to the hope that there are enough of those citizens…

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Let Me Explain This One More Time…

I see that Tucker Carlson has applauded the demise of Roe v. Wade, and characterized the decision as a “return to democracy.” Evidently, someone needs to explain America’s approach to democratic self-rule to Tucker and his constitutionally-illiterate audience.

Democratic systems can take several forms. In a “pure” democracy, where an unrestrained majority rules, voters participate in all government decision-making; the majority is even able to decide who has the right to vote. (I’m unaware of any country with so “pure” a democracy, for obvious reasons.)

America’s Founders didn’t choose that system. (For one thing, their concerns about the “passions of the majority” were well-known.) Instead, they crafted a republic in which voters would choose lawmakers from among the ranks of the thoughtful and knowledgable (!!), and those lawmakers would debate the merits of legislative proposals, negotiate and compromise among the various points of view, and pass well-considered laws.

Then they constrained those lawmakers by enacting a Bill of Rights.

The Bill of Rights–as I have often explained in these posts–is essentially a list of things that American government is forbidden to do, even when a majority of voters approve. Thanks to the Bill of Rights, government cannot censor our communications. It cannot prescribe our prayers (although after the Court’s most recent ruling, it can evidently coerce them) or dictate our reading materials. It cannot search or seize us without probable cause.  It cannot invade our liberties or take our property without due process of law.

Let me reiterate that, for the edification of any Fox viewers who might be lurking: the Bill of Rights limits what popular majorities can authorize government to do. It is a limitation on majority rule–on what the Tucker Carlsons of this world conceive of as democracy. It protects the right of individuals to choose their own political and religious beliefs and follow their own life goals, their own telos, free of government–or majority– interference.

Over the years, the Court has had to interpret the operation of the Bill of Rights–to apply its broad principles and protections to specific situations. Since the 1960s and until this week, the Court has recognized a right to privacy, and has drawn a line between decisions that government can properly make, and those that must be left to the individual. It has based that line on citizens’ right to due process.

There are two kinds of due process: procedural and substantive. Substantive due process (often called the right to privacy) is the doctrine that requires official respect for individual autonomy–the doctrine that forbids government from making decisions that are none of government’s business, “intimate” decisions that under longstanding understandings of the Bill of Rights must be left up to the individual involved.

The existence of that line protecting individual liberty from government interference rests on multiple precedents interpreting the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 

If the doctrine of substantive due process goes away, those “democratic” state governments so beloved by Tucker Carlson will have the right to prohibit same-sex or interracial marriage, re-criminalize sodomy, and ban the sale and use of birth control…All of those rights and others are in the cross-hairs so long as Republicans can keep their stranglehold on American government via gerrymandering, the Electoral College and other mechanisms  (mechanisms that are all, ironically, exceedingly anti-democratic). 

The decision overturning Roe was deeply dishonest, especially in its discussion about  whether a particular right was historically recognized, but Alito’s distorted history is ultimately irrelevant– a red herring. In order to find that the government has a right to control the reproductive decisions of individual women, the Court had to fatally undermine the doctrine of substantive due process. And when that doctrine is no longer viable, all other personal rights are vulnerable.

Clarence Thomas may have been the only Justice willing to admit to the obvious agenda of this rogue Court, but it is abundantly clear that the other four members of the religious tribunal that now controls the Court share that agenda.

Debates about abortion have always been both superficial and dishonest. “Pro life” has always been a misnomer, since anti-choice policy is blatantly indifferent to the lives of women (and to the lives and welfare of fetuses once they become children). But there needs to be far more recognition that this decision isn’t simply an endorsement of the right of state governments\ to make very bad policy decisions–it is an endorsement of autocracy, of the right of government to invade the most personal precincts of citizens’ lives, and to impose the religious views of those in power on those of us without.

Giving legislators the right to make my most intimate decisions isn’t the Founders’ view of “democracy”– and it sure as hell isn’t mine.

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A Way Around

Sane Americans need to vote as if our lives depend upon it, because in a very real sense, they do.

In the meantime…

When the religious warriors on the Supreme Court handed down their decision requiring states that funded private schools to fund religious ones as well– Carson v. Makin– our daughter (who spent 20 years on our local school board) asked whether there was now any way to fashion voucher programs that would prevent most religious schools from getting taxpayer money. Surely good lawyers could devise such a work-around.

Turns out there is. And it’s a tactic that can also be used to blunt some of the most dangerous consequences of the Court’s even-more-radical gun decision. (Unfortunately, I see no comparable “work arounds” for the Court’s horrifying abortion decision.)

Maine shows the way to keep public dollars out of church coffers. In Carson, the Court based its decision on the disparate treatment of religious and nonreligious private schools, so Maine eliminated that disparity–and did so in the best possible way.

What is surprising is how little the 6-to-3 decision in the Maine case, Carson v. Makin, will matter practically. And the reason offers a glimpse of hope for those who worry about a future dominated by the court’s conservative supermajority — including the many Americans troubled by the court’s decision in the gun case, New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen.

Let’s start with the Carson case. Anticipating this week’s decision, Maine lawmakers enacted a crucial amendment to the state’s anti-discrimination law last year in order to counteract the expected ruling. The revised law forbids discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, and it applies to every private school that chooses to accept public funds, without regard to religious affiliation.

The impact was immediate: The two religious schools at issue in the Carson case, Bangor Christian Schools and Temple Academy, said that they would decline state funds if, as Maine’s new law requires, accepting such funds would require them to change how they operate or alter their “admissions standards” to admit L.G.B.T.Q. students.

The “fix” to Maine’s law allows religious schools to participate in the program on an equal basis with other private schools–and as an added bonus, ensures that secular private schools with discriminatory practices will also be denied the right to participate.

In an aside, the Court acknowledged that Maine also retains the right to eliminate its voucher program at any point. (Since most voucher programs–like Indiana’s– have failed to improve student outcomes while bleeding the public schools of needed resources, that’s a right I think they should exercise. But I digress.)

As the linked Times essay pointed out, a version of Maine’s tactic can also be adapted to use by the states (all blue) trying to combat gun violence.

Justice Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion made clear that the constitutionality of restrictions is historically “settled” in “sensitive places” such as legislatures, courtrooms and polling locations, and that “modern regulations” may “prohibit” the carry of firearms in “new” places. Given that, states should enact an expansive list of so-called sensitive places where guns may not be carried. Though Justice Thomas did not specify which those might be, during oral arguments in November, several justices pondered that they might include public transportation, crowded venues, university campuses and places where alcohol is served.

 Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted in a concurrence joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, moreover, that while states may not impose restrictions that prevent “ordinary, law abiding citizens” from carrying a gun to defend themselves, states can still enact rigorous requirements for a public carry permit, such as stringent background and mental health records checks and completion of regular training courses.

Another promising reform for states to consider would be to require gun owners to possess firearm liability insurance. Not only would such a requirement ensure that victims of gun violence can recover for their losses and “provide financial incentives for responsible arms carrying,” but it also draws strong historical support from a host of 19th century “surety laws” recognized in the court’s opinion.

That last “promising reform” echoes several comments made to this blog. 

This guest essay reminds us that–as critical as it is to repair a broken and increasingly illegitimate  Court–until that repair can be accomplished, we are not without resources to fight, or at least blunt, the consequences of the Court’s most dramatic departures from constitutional precedent and common sense. We just need lawmakers who understand the need to do so.

That means that the most important thing we can do is remember in November which party is responsible for replacing Justices committed to the Constitution with  a religious tribunal–and vote accordingly. 

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What Can We Do About The Supreme Court?

It’s no longer possible to avoid recognizing the extreme radicalization of the United States Supreme Court.  As an email from the Center for Inquiry accurately characterized the latest ruling, it was “not the act of a secular court but of a religious tribunal.” 

Since the ascension of Mitch McConnell’s hand-picked culture warriors, we have seen a steady stream of decisions laying waste to the legal underpinnings of American liberties. I have written before about the terrifying implications of the abortion ruling,  and why it threatens a much broader array of personal liberties than reproductive autonomy. (In his concurring opinion in Dobbs, Thomas made that threat quite explicit.) The Court has continued its assault on genuine religious liberty, which requires separation of church and state. And its wholesale abandonment of previous precedents on gun legislation–including even the pro-Second-Amendment decision in Heller written by “originalist” Antonin Scalia–is further evidence of a Court majority intent upon rewriting and re-imagining two hundred years of constitutional jurisprudence.

A reader asked me to comment on a report from the Brennan Center proposing changes to the way jurists are elevated to the high court. It is worth emphasizing that the Center issued this paper in 2019, and that it is only one of numerous proposals published during decades of scholarship addressing increasing concerns about the Court’s operations– the analysis was not written as a response to the recent blitz of appalling decisions.

Perhaps the thorniest issue raised by the current operation of the Court involves what the Brennan paper calls “democratic accountability.”

Judicial accountability is different from legislative or executive accountability; the whole purpose of lifetime appointments to the federal bench was to insulate the judiciary from the political passions of the moment–to avoid the sort of “accountability” to political pressure that the other branches  quite properly experience. The Executive and Legislative branches were created to be (more or less) directly answerable to “we the people,” but judges were expected to make thoughtful and considered decisions based on the law and facts as they saw them. (Electing judges, as some states do, is a repudiation of that foundational intent.)

On the other hand, the courts certainly weren’t meant to be untouchable quasi-legislative bodies. (Remember when Republicans screamed about “Judicial Activism” and “Imperial Courts”?) There are several ways to insure appropriate democratic accountability without abandoning the original purpose of lifetime appointments.

As the Brennan report noted,

Two funda­mental flaws in the Consti­tu­tion’s appoint­ment system must be fixed. First, there is no regu­lar­ized system for Supreme Court appoint­ments. Because pres­id­ents can appoint new justices only when a sitting justice resigns or dies, justices are appoin­ted unevenly, so that some pres­id­ents have many appoint­ments, while others have few or even none. In addi­tion, because justices now serve longer on aver­age than their prede­cessors, there are signi­fic­antly fewer appoint­ment oppor­tun­it­ies. These devel­op­ments fray the only formal link between the court and the people — nomin­a­tion by an elec­ted pres­id­ent and confirm­a­tion (or not) by elec­ted senat­ors. In the early days of the repub­lic, when the court was viewed as weak, such defects caused little harm. But today, with the court hold­ing immense power, the lottery appoint­ment system under­mines the court’s consti­tu­tional legit­im­acy and erodes the court’s connec­tion to our demo­cracy.

Second, life tenure permits justices them­selves to stra­tegic­ally time their retire­ments so that an ideo­lo­gic­ally like-minded pres­id­ent can appoint their successor. Recently, this has become the norm. Such ideo­lo­gical control of a Supreme Court seat was never contem­plated by the founders. In addi­tion, some justices have remained on the court after a severe decline in their mental or phys­ical capa­cit­ies, in hopes of last­ing until a pres­id­ent who shares their legal and policy pref­er­ences takes office. Such ideo­lo­gical control of a Supreme Court seat was never contem­plated by the founders when they wrote the Consti­tu­tion.

In the current system, some pres­id­ents appoint an outsized number of justices, some justices outlive the offi­cials who appointed them by many years, and  justices can time their retirements to ensure the ideo­logy of their successors. Worse still, a majority of Justices on the current Court were appointed by Presidents who had lost the popular vote.

As a result, today’s Court lacks democratic legitimacy. 

Correcting the two flaws described in the linked report would require a constitutional amendment prescribing regular appointments coupled term limits. (Constitutional scholars argue that 18-year terms should be adequate to insulate judges from political pressure.)

Given the daunting barriers to passage of constitutional amendments–not to mention the lengthy timeframe of even successful efforts– several legal scholars advocate enlarging the Court. Changing the number of Justices can be done by statute, and in fact, has been done before. Suggestions for enlarging the Court long preceded the current Court, and were prompted primarily by workload concerns–more recent Courts hand down far fewer decisions than previous ones did.

 The author of the Brennan report dismisses that remedy as too partisan, but–as I noted previously–his paper was written before Amy Coney Barrett joined the Court, bringing to five the number of radical religious culture warriors (with the frequent concurrence of the Chief Justice) intent upon dismantling years of constitutional jurisprudence. And five is enough to get the job done.

If the addition of justices is seen as partisan, so be it. The current Court is a thoroughly partisan religious tribunal–and a clear and present danger to the Republic. Ignoring that fact is not an option.

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