Tag Archives: messaging

Political Attention Deficit Disorder

The problem isn’t the message. It’s getting people to hear the message.

While pundits and strategists wring their hands and insist that the Democrats have “a messaging problem,” that diagnosis misstates the real problem. Chris Hayes recently–and accurately–wrote an essay for the New York Times (which, to ironically emphasize his point, MAGA folks are highly unlikely to read), in which he quite accurately described our information environment, where the problem isn’t the message, it’s getting people to hear the message.

Take the national election in 2024. Hayes (again, in my view, quite accurately) asserts that the Harris-Walz campaign’s message was fine. The campaign not only spent ample money on advertising, it concentrated that effort in the swing states–and as a result, swing state voters were less likely to defect to Trump than in non-swing states. “And the message of those ads was in line with a lot of what many critics have suggested — focused on core economic issues and framed in populist terms, with Kamala Harris portrayed as an ally of the working class.”

In other words, even though she lost, her core problem was not her message, however imperfect it might have been. It was an inability to get enough people to hear it, in spite of record-breaking advertising spending. If Mr. Trump had not run a single paid advertisement in the race, he almost surely would have dominated the single most important resource of our age: attention. Democrats need to win the attention contest in 2026 and beyond if they want to win back the country.

And winning attention is a lot harder than it used to be.

For one thing, as Hayes notes, ever since Teddy Roosevelt coined the term “bully pulpit,” the political party that doesn’t control the White House has struggled to match the agenda-setting power of the presidency. And as he also points out, today’s asymmetry is more daunting and profound than ever, because Trump has a “feral, almost pathological genius for getting people to talk about him, and to a degree that his supporters find thrilling and his opponents find suffocating, he dominates the nation’s and the world’s attention.”

As I have often argued on this blog and elsewhere, the fragmentation of our information environment frustrates efforts to communicate with a broad and diverse public. Not only have we lost the community newspapers that were widely trusted, and that accurately if scantily reported national news along with the results of the last City Council vote, not only do we have national mass media news that is little more than propaganda (think Fox and Sinclair); people use the Internet to confirm their biases rather than to access sources of vetted journalism.

Add to that–as one of the commenters to this blog regularly reminds us– the national penchant for entertainment. Given a choice between a football game and a news program–or a choice between a concert and a lecture–millions of Americans will happily choose the game or the concert. Hayes’ advice to Democrats is to “go everywhere”–to appear in forums that are untraditional. Podcasts, television shows, places where candidates talk “off-script” and  with “lots of different kinds of interlocutors.”

And in our social media age, he emphasizes the need to post. Constantly.

It’s not just how you campaign and which outlets you talk to, though. Successful campaigns must prioritize producing content. One thing successful content creators will tell you about excelling in the world of digital attention is that there’s no penalty for quantity. No one checks your percentages — only your total numbers. You need to always be posting if you want a better chance of things going viral or at least ending up in the algorithmic slipstream that shoots it out to millions of eyeballs. So Democratic campaigns and candidates should be thinking about how their campaigns are going to produce a lot of attention-grabbing short-form videos to meet the most disengaged and youngest voters where they are.

He points to candidates who have effectively used social media–Mamdani in New York, AOC, a North Carolina candidate. Hayes also counsels candidates not to be risk-averse, not to worry about negative attention. (The proof of that recommendation has to be Donald Trump, who–despite his demonstrable lack of mental acuity–was evidently born knowing that any and all publicity is good publicity.)

As Hayes argues, the public has become distracted and distractible, and gaffes, controversial and even offensive statements  no longer matter the way they did. When people are distracted, they rarely recall anything but the name.

And we’re all distracted all the time now.

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The Biggest Problem We Face

In a recent conversation, my youngest son made an observation that went to the very heart of America’s current political dysfunction: it’s the media–but not in the way that accusation usually assumes. Whatever the considerable deficits of “mainstream” coverage–and there were plenty of them–focusing on the New York Times and Washington Post and their ilk ignores the fact that the vast majority of Trump voters never read them. 

As my son pointed out, what almost all of the finger-pointing and attacks on “messaging” miss is that Harris’s messaging was fine (indeed, it was arguably better than Democratic messaging in prior election cycles). That messaging would have made a huge difference–had it reached a majority of voters.  

It didn’t.

We live in a time when mainstream media reaches far fewer people than the right wing media ecosystem that has developed in our digital age. That ecosystem goes far beyond Fox and Sinclair–it includes sites like AONN, social media like X/twitter, and all of the rightwing troll farms, bloggers, and podcasters.  Their effectiveness rests on a dimly-understood reality: not only do these sources collectively reach more people, unlike mainstream outlets they are all on the same page--they reinforce and repeat the same propaganda, ignore the same “inconvenient” facts, and do so over sustained periods of time. Not only do they distort reality and manufacture issues (immigrants are eating dogs and cats), they encourage their audiences to blame groups against whom they’re already prejudiced. 

The center/left has absolutely nothing like this, and would be philosophically allergic to establishing a similar propaganda arm.  

There is evidence that Harris’s message would have been persuasive had it been able to penetrate that rightwing echo chamber. When the candidates’ names were removed, and only their policy proposals were polled, Harris’s plans and statements were vastly more popular than Trump’s.  But Harris’ messaging never reached a majority of Trump voters.  

It is certainly the case that significant numbers of voters simply refused to hear her, thanks to the rampant sexism and racism that characterized much of the voting public, but we cannot dismiss the importance of the fact that a majority of the American voting public never sees mainstream coverage. (People struggling to put food on the table don’t subscribe to the New York Times.) The deciding plurality of voters who delivered the election to Trump received only the Trump cult’s  messaging. 

If that observation is true–and there’s ample research to confirm its accuracy–Democrats need to stop their carping about what the campaign did or didn’t do right, and address the (pun intended) elephant in the room. How can fact-based information be delivered to people who have opted to get all of their information from a massive, co-ordinated right-wing propaganda ecosystem?

I tend to agree with my son, who argues that the actual messaging mistake wasn’t content or tone. It was dissemination.

Democrats have made a very consequential error in refusing to engage with the propaganda on the propagandists’ turf. Only Pete Buttigeig and Gavin Newsom have been willing to take Democratic perspectives onto that turf–to bring contending facts and messages to the millions of people who get their “facts” from media sources voicing the preferred messages of what Hillary Clinton once–quite accurately– called “the vast right-wing conspiracy.”

Autocrats everywhere understand the power of media, and move to control it. In the United States, a shadowy network of rightwing think tanks, theocratic organizations and plutocrats have been working for decades to roll back the “woke” politics of inclusion and civic equality–to return us to a social order dominated by straight White Christian males. Participants in that network understood that control of information was key to the success of that effort, and the right-wing media ecosystem is the result.

I often remind readers that support for the Constitution and the Rule of Law requires an informed public. When a significant portion of the public is misinformed, when they are fed uncontested propaganda that feeds and plays to their already-potent fears and prejudices, we get outcomes like the one we got on November 5th. 

How to penetrate that ecosystem is a conundrum. Making it even more challenging is the vocabulary of the Right. I’ll discuss that further obstacle to political sanity tomorrow.

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When Words Lose Their Meaning….

Before I was a lawyer, I was a high school English teacher, a position that required me to  explain how language communicates meaning–the roles played by denotation and connotation, and the often-unrecognized difficulty of getting one’s point across.

Recognizing that you may hear my use of term A to explain X  as an admission of Y is one  of the most frustrating aspects of political communication. it’s a problem that goes well beyond the obvious fatuity of slogans like “Defund the Police,” and it makes messaging particularly difficult for Democrats; the GOP base shares focused grievances that allow party strategists to communicate to a cohesive and receptive cult. Democrats who wring their hands over the party’s inept “messaging” aren’t wrong, exactly, but they fail to recognize both the inherent difficulties of language, and the Democrats’ need to reach people who occupy a broad spectrum of opinion.

A recent essay in the New York Times provides an example rooted in “dog whistle” days. It’s titled: “A Handy Guide to the Republican Definition of a Crime,” and it harkens back to that tried and true Republican demand for “law and order”–the meaning of which has changed rather dramatically.

If you think Republicans are still members of the law-and-order party, you haven’t been paying close attention lately. Since the rise of Donald Trump, the Republican definition of a crime has veered sharply from the law books and become extremely selective. For readers confused about the party’s new positions on law and order, here’s a guide to what today’s Republicans consider a crime, and what they do not.

Not a crime: Federal crimes. All federal crimes are charged and prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Now that Republicans believe the department has been weaponized into a Democratic Party strike force, particularly against Mr. Trump, its prosecutions can no longer be trusted. “The weaponization of federal law enforcement represents a mortal threat to a free society,” Gov. Ron DeSantis of Florida recently tweeted.

The F.B.I., which investigates many federal crimes, has also become corrupted by the same political forces. “The F.B.I. has become a political weapon for the ruling elite rather than an impartial, law-enforcement agency,” said Kevin D. Roberts, the president of the right-wing Heritage Foundation.

And because tax crimes are not real crimes, Republicans have fought for years to slash the number of I.R.S. investigators who fight against cheating.

Having clarified why federal misbehaviors no longer qualify as criminal, the essay explains the current GOP approach to the labeling of state and local crime: if it happens in an urban area or in states run by Democrats, it’s a crime.

On the other hand,

Not a crime: Any crime that happens in rural areas or in states run by Republicans.
Between 2000 and 2021, the per capita murder rate in states that voted for Donald Trump was 23 percent higher than in states that voted for Joe Biden, according to one major study. The gap is growing, and it is visible even in the rural areas of Trump states.

But this didn’t come up when a Trump ally, Representative Jim Jordan of Ohio, held a hearing in New York in April to blast Manhattan’s prosecutor for being lax on crime, even though rates for all seven major crime categories are higher in Ohio than in New York City. Nor does House Speaker Kevin McCarthy — who tweets about Democratic “lawlessness” — talk about the per capita homicide rate in Bakersfield, Calif., which he represents, which has been the highest in California for years and is higher than New York City’s.

Republicans now include under their motto of “law and order” the “crimes” of abortion and transgender care, prohibition of which they piously frame as protection of children. (As the essay notes, GOP solicitude for the young doesn’t extend to regulating the guns that are the leading cause of American children’s deaths.)

There are other  GOP “definitions.” If Hunter Biden did it, it’s a crime. Trump and his offspring? Didn’t notice any wrongdoing–despite vast evidence of influence-peddling and self-dealing that would seem to violate the emoluments clause of the Constitution and any number of federal ethics guidelines.

And of course, there was Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server, leading to the GOP’s righteous demands to “lock her up.” That was criminal behavior, unlike Trump’s obviously innocent efforts to overturn an election and his theft of classified materials.

Effective messaging and communication require clarity and simplicity. The GOP has mastered it. “Law and order” still means “arrest Black people,” but now it also means “if Republicans did it, it was lawful; if Democrats did it, it was criminal.”

Unfortunately, that simple message cannot be countered with an equally simple response; explaining why it is dishonest requires facts and logic–and listeners.

Communication is hard.

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