Tag Archives: privatization

Selling Indiana: Update

This past weekend, the LA Times and the Northwest Indiana Times both had stories about Mitch Daniel’s privatization initiatives.

The Northwest Indiana article reported on the impending default of the private operator of the Indiana Toll Road. While a default would probably not cost Indiana taxpayers–the private operator paid us in advance–it might well cost us what little control we retained over the Toll Road, and depending upon how the default played out, might require some legal fees.

The LA Times article, on the other hand, was the sort of in-depth reporting that has become all too rare nationally, and virtually non-existent here in Indianapolis.  It traced the disaster that was Indiana’s effort to contract out welfare intake, and it is well worth reading in its entirety. High points include a description of ACS ties to Indiana political figures and “movers and shakers”–especially Stephen Goldsmith, Mitch Roob and the Barnes Thornburgh law firm–together with a list of associated campaign contributions, and several examples of the harm done to vulnerable elderly and disabled people who depended on the program.

The Star did do several stories early on, when the failures of IBM and ACS were at their most glaring, and again when Daniels admitted defeat and pulled IBM’s (but not ACS’) contract. And it ran a story when IBM sued the state. But there was no effort to “connect the dots” and nothing even close to the comprehensive investigation provided by the LA Times.

That lack of a full picture matters, because without it, reporters fail to recognize the context within which we must understand related information.

A couple of weeks ago, the Daniels Administration announced that it had received an award from the federal government for cutting the food stamp program’s negative error rate–how often cases are incorrectly closed or denied. The Administration bragged that Indiana’s error rate was below the national average.  The Star dutifully reported the (accurate) claim. What didn’t get reported was the fact that from 2001 to 2007–prior to welfare privatization–Indiana’s error rate had also been below the national average, but in 2008, one year after IBM and ACS took over, the error rate had more than doubled, to 13%.  It was the largest increase in the country, and the celebrated “improvement” was measured from that high point.

Context matters. So does journalism.

Politics and Propaganda

I opened the Sunday Indianapolis Star to a front-page story about Governor Mitch Daniels’ claim that public employees make more than their private-sector counterparts. The article discussed the issue in the “fair and balanced” way we’ve come to expect from “journalists” today, dutifully reporting on the “he said/she said” dueling studies–without bothering to tell readers which studies were sound and which were utter garbage.

I am absolutely confident I could conduct a study demonstrating that people who exercise less break fewer bones–if i didn’t bother to control for things like overall mobility and severity of breaks that did occur. I can see the headline now: Study shows that less exercise leads to better bone health.

There’s a reason academic journals insist on peer reviews.

The Star gave equal weight to two studies. One simply compared overall wages of private and public employees. It found public employees doing slightly better. The other study controlled for factors like education, duration of the workday, etc. In other words, it compared people with similar skills and educational training to each other. (What we used to call “apples to apples” comparisons.) That study–surprise!–did not confirm the Governor’s charge.

The article also reported that Indiana has fewer public employees than it did when Daniels assumed office, and it attributed that decline to privatization. But privatization, an inaccurate term for contracting out for services, does not reduce government employment, except in the very narrow sense of “on the State’s payroll.” If the government is paying someone to perform a task, that person is effectively an employee of the government. It may be harder to recognize that fact, because his compensation is being paid through an intervening party (who gets a cut, not incidentally, called profit), but when government is paying someone for providing services and dictating the nature of those services, that someone is effectively a government employee.

A study that really should be conducted would investigate just how many of these de-facto state employees there are in Indiana. (Several years ago, at an academic conference, a well-known scholar explained to me that the federal government had the equivalent of 18 million additional employees. They weren’t counted as federal workers, because they worked for private contractors, but they were employed full-time providing public services.)

Whether you are a proponent or opponent of government contracting–and as readers of this blog know, I’m firmly in the “it depends” category–this sort of game-playing goes beyond disingenuous. It’s not just inaccurate; it’s propaganda.

It would be nice if we had journalists who could tell the difference.

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When Privatizing Met Public Infrastructure

As readers of this blog know, I’m not a “believer” in contracting-out–what we Americans quaintly call “privatization.” I’m not necessarily opposed to contracting, either–it’s a tool that can be appropriate in many circumstances. Call me an agnostic.

It’s important to examine claims about privatizing, because contracting is too often a form of patronage–a way of rewarding campaign contributors–or, as we’ve seen in Indiana, a way that canny politicians can borrow from the future to provide services that should be paid for from current tax revenues.

When we start privatizing public infrastructure–toll roads and parking meters, for example–it is even more important to ask what the research shows. We know what the politicians who are pushing these deals say; what does the evidence say?

Ellen Dannin is a law professor who is a national expert on contracting, and she has just published an important (and sobering) analysis of what happens when public infrastructure is privatized. In “Crumbling Infrastructure, Crumbling Democracy: Infrastructure Privatization Contracts and Their Effects on State and Local Governance,”
Dannin finds that these agreements typically make the public the guarantor of private contractors’ profits, and ” give private contractors quasi-governmental status, with power over new laws, judicial decisions, propositions voted on by the public, and other governmental actions.”

Well worth a read!


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What Drives Me Crazy

A couple of days ago, I got my ever-thinner print version of Newsweek, and began leafing through it. I came to an article by one Niall Ferguson (“Niall Ferguson Solves the Debt Crisis”) I don’t know who Ferguson is, although I’ve seen his name here and there, but obviously, if he has a solution to the “debt crisis,” (the precise nature of which was conveniently undefined), I wanted to know what it was.

And what was it? Privatization, which–he blandly assured readers–“has been a huge success nearly everywhere it’s been tried.”

When I came to that sentence, my husband called from another room to ask me why I was making that strange noise.

Let me explain why Mr. Ferguson’s article made my head explode. I have spent a reasonable percent of my time in academia studying privatization, and have written a number of (peer reviewed) articles on the subject, and it is clear that Ferguson is, shall we say, confused. The first clue is his reference to Margaret Thatcher’s successes. I agree that much of Thatcher’s privatization effort was successful and sound, but what Thatcher called privatization was very different from what Americans mean when we use the term. Thatcher sold off assets (steel mills, for example) that most economists would agree should never have been owned by government in the first place. And she sold them, to private owners who were left to own and operate them, pay taxes on any profits, and go under if they failed. These assets were no longer on the British government’s balance sheets, for good or ill.

This is significantly different from the situation in the United States, for two reasons. First of all, we were never socialized to the extent that England and many European countries were, so our governmental units–with very few exceptions–do not own property that is extraneous to the mission of government. We don’t have publicly owned steel mills or coal mines or other assets more appropriate to private ownership to sell off. Ferguson cites Mitch Daniels’ “lease” of Indiana’s public highways with approval; I think many of us would argue that public roads are hardly in the same category as steel mills.

That allusion to Indiana’s Toll Road brings us to the second difference between British and American practices: what we call privatization in the U.S. isn’t really privatization. We use the term to mean “contracting out.” If we have potholes to fill (and right now, boy do we!) we ask private asphalt companies to bid on filling them–we don’t expect government to manufacture its own asphalt and use its own employees to do the job–but we don’t expect government to sell the streets and allow the market to determine which ones get paved, either.

I didn’t intend to turn this post into an academic lecture/rant, but I get so tired of pompous pundits who don’t bother to do any homework, who don’t bother to define their terms, blandly prescribing simple fixes for complicated issues they clearly do not understand.  If Ferguson is advocating that we sell off government assets, he needs to distinguish such outright sales from the “leases” and “contracts” that Americans are familiar with, and he needs to identify the assets that he believes should be privately rather than publicly owned. (I’d be quite willing to sell off sports stadiums, but I’d fight a proposed sale of libraries.) If we ever have that discussion, I think it is highly unlikely that we’d find enough stuff to sell to retire the national debt.

And just for Mr. Ferguson’s information, privatization (defined as contracting out) has not been a “success nearly everywhere.” I’d be happy to supply him with citations to multiple studies demonstrating quite the contrary–but somehow I doubt he’d be interested.

Who said “It ain’t what you don’t know that hurts you, it’s what you know that just ain’t so”?

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Park It

Mayor Ballard’s proposal to privatize the city’s parking continues to spark bipartisan concern. Last week, the Sunday Star ran a “point-counterpoint” between Deputy Mayor Michael Huber, the proposal’s architect, and Aaron Renn, a respected urban affairs expert who has criticized it. Star editor Dennis Ryerson noted that many open questions should be answered before the City-County Council makes a final decision.

What are those questions?

Why would any city turn over an important part of its infrastructure to any private company for fifty years? Even if the deal were less one-sided fiscally, decisions about where to place meters, how to price them, what lengths of time to allow and so on have an enormous impact on local businesses and residential neighborhoods. They are decisions requiring flexibility in the face of changing circumstances; they are most definitely not decisions that should be held hostage to contracting provisions aimed at protecting a vendor’s profits.

Why would we enter into a contract that will add significantly to the costs of downtown development? Indianapolis has worked hard to encourage construction of hotels, retail establishments and residential units in our urban core. Often, that construction interrupts adjacent parking. Now, the city can choose to ignore that loss of parking revenue, or to charge the developer, based upon the City’s best interests. This contract requires that ACS be paid whenever such interruptions occur. It has been estimated that such a provision would have added over two million dollars to the cost of the current legs of the Cultural Trail.

Why ACS? Much has been written about the problems with Chicago’s parking privatization, but far less about ACS’ track record in places like Washington, D.C., where an audit documented mismanagement, overcharging, over-counting of meters, and the issuance of bogus tickets (ACS gets all the revenue for tickets). Washington lost $8,823,447 in revenue and experienced a twenty-fold increase in complaints from the public. And it wasn’t just D.C. Police officers in Edmonton, Canada, were tried for accepting bribes from ACS, and a few years ago, the company’s CEO and CFO stepped down after admitting to $51 million in stock fraud. Why enter into such a disadvantageous deal for so long a term with a company having so troubling a track record?

One of the problems with privatization in general, as we learned during the Goldsmith administration, is that it leads to speculation about cronyism and political back-scratching. In this case, the Mayor’s personal advisor is a registered lobbyist for ACS through Barnes and Thornburg, the same law firm that employs the President of the City-County Council. Whatever the facts of the situation, those relationships raise an appearance of impropriety.

Finally, why not simply retain control of our infrastructure, and issue revenue bonds for the necessary improvements? Interest rates are at a historic low, making it an excellent time to do so. If this administration simply can’t manage parking, create a Municipal Parking Authority, as Councilor Jackie Nytes has suggested.

However we proceed, we should park this proposal. Permanently.

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